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Introduction
Introduction
Several data mining techniques, incorporating privacy protection mecha-
nisms, have been developed based on different approaches. For instance, various
sanitization techniques have been proposed for hiding sensitive items or patterns
that are based on removing reserved information or inserting noise into data.
Privacy preserving classification methods, instead, prevent a miner from build-
ing a classifier able to predict sensitive data. Additionally, privacy preserving
clustering techniques have been recently proposed, which distort sensitive nu-
merical attributes, while preserving general features for clustering analysis.
Given the number of different privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) tech-
niques that have been developed over the last years, there is an emerging need
of moving toward standardization in this new research area, as discussed in [67].
We believe that one step toward this essential process is the definition of a frame-
work identifying the various parameters which characterize a PPDM algorithm,
thus making it possible to assess and compare such techniques according to a
fixed set of evaluation criteria. Because all the various techniques differ among
each other with respect to a number of criteria, like performance, data quality,
privacy level, it is important to provide a systematic and comprehensive frame-
work for their evaluation. In many cases, no technique is better than the other
ones with respect to all criteria. Thus, one has to select the privacy preserving
technique based on the criterion to be optimized.
An unified framework allowing to satisfy these goals is essential in order
to select the privacy preserving technique which is more adequate based on
the data and the requirements of the application domain. Moreover, a major
feature of PPDM techniques is that they usually entail modifications to the data
in order to sanitize them from sensitive information (both private data items
and complex data correlations) or to anonymize them with some uncertainty
level. Therefore, in evaluating a PPDM algorithm it is important to assess
the quality of the transformed data. To do this, we need methodologies for the
assessment of the quality of data, intended as the state of the individual items in
the database resulting from the application of a privacy preserving technique, as
well as the quality of the information that is extracted from the modified data
by using a given data mining method. As we already explained, the former
notion of data quality is strictly related to the use the data are intended for.
Moreover, some of those algorithms can be computationally very expensive and
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thus cannot be used when very large sets of data need to be frequently released.
Therefore, in addition to data quality, performance also needs to be carefully
assessed. Other aspects, like scalability, need also to be taken into account since
the data collected, stored and managed for the mining process grow enormously.
We thus clearly need a comprehensive evaluation framework characterized by
several metrics relevant for assessing the various aspects of PPDM algorithms.
In this report, we present results of our researches on this topic [10,11], and
more in detail, a framework which allows one to compare the various privacy
preserving techniques on a common platform. The framework consists of a
number of evaluation criteria and a set of tools for data pre-processing and
PPDM algorithm evaluation. The framework has been extensively used for
assessing a suite of PPDM algorithms developed as part of the CODMINE
project [97]. Moreover, due to the fact that the problem of disclosing private
information when partially or totally releasing data storage is also addressed in
the area of statistical databases1 we also analyze and compare some of these
methods along with the metrics used for evaluating them.
1We remember here that the statistical disclosure control (SDC) aims at protecting indi-
vidual data, referred to as microdata according to the SDC terminology, when releasing some
relevant statistics by means of statistics-based techniques, some of which are also adopted in
the area of data mining
Chapter 1
State of the art
We already explained in the introduction that no unified framework exists sup-
porting the evaluation of PPDM algorithms. Moreover a set of universally
accepted general parameters on the basis of which one can evaluate some par-
ticular aspects of PPDM algorithms not exist. In this chapter, we will briefly
focus our attention on the parameters used by the different authors of PPDM
algorithms in order to prove the properties of their algorithms. Moreover, on
the basis of the presented parameters we will make some considerations on the
goals a PPDM must (or should) satisfy. This short presentation will act as the
basis over which we will build the remaining part of this report.
1.1 Evaluation, State of The Art
Oliveira and Zaiane [68] in the evaluation of their heuristic-based framework
for preserving privacy in mining frequent itemsets introduce some measures
quantifying the effectiveness and the efficiency of their algorithms. The first
parameter is evaluated in terms of
• Hiding Failure, that is, the percentage of restrictive patterns that are
discovered from the sanitized database.
• Misses Cost, that is, the percentage of non-restrictive patterns that are
hidden after the sanitization process.
• Artifactual Pattern, measured in terms of the percentage of discovered
patterns that are artifacts.
Moreover, the specification of a disclosure threshold φ, representing the percent-
age of sensitive transactions that are not sanitized, allows one to find a balance
between the hiding failure and the number of misses. The efficiency of the al-
gorithms is measured in terms of CPU time, by first keeping constant both the
size of the database and the set of restrictive patterns, and then by increasing
the size of the input data in order to assess the algorithm scalability. Moreover,
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Oliveira and Zaiane propose three different methods to measure the dissimilar-
ity between the original and sanitized databases. The first method is based on
the difference between the frequency histograms of the original and the sanitized
databases. The second method is based on computing the difference between
the sizes of the sanitized database and the original one. The third method is
based on a comparison between the contents of two databases.
In [92], instead, Sweeney proposes a heuristic-based approach for protect-
ing raw data through generalization and suppression techniques. The method
she proposes provides K-Anonymity. As already explained in Chapter 2, in
some way, the cell distortion that normally affects a database sanitized by K-
anonymity, can be identified as a measure of DQ impact of the sanitization on
the target database. Sweeney measures the cell distortion as the ratio of the
domain of the attribute to the height of the attribute generalization which is
a hierarchy. In the same article the concept of precision is also introduced.
Given a table T , the precision represents the information loss incurred by the
conversion process from a table T to a K-Anonymous Table T k. More in detail
the precision of a table T k is measured as follows:
Given a database DB with NA attributes and N transactions, if we identify
as generalization scheme a domain generalization hierarchy GT with a depth h,
it is possible to measure the quality of a sanitized database SDB as:
Quality(SDB) = 1−
  i=NA
i=1
  i=N
j=1
h
|GTAi|
|DB| ∗ |NA|
(1.1)
where h|GTAi| represent the detail loss for each cell sanitized.
Agrawal and Srikant in [4] introduce a quantitative measure to evaluate
the amount of privacy offered by a method and evaluate the proposed method
against this measure. More specifically, if one can estimate with c% confidence
that a value x lies in an interval, then the width of such interval defines the
amount of privacy with a c% confidence level. They also assess the accuracy of
the proposed algorithms for Uniform and Gaussian perturbation and for fixed
privacy level. In [2] Agrawal and Aggarwal propose some metrics in order to
evaluate privacy and information loss. Unlike the approach in [4], the privacy
metric proposed by Agrawal and Aggarwal takes into account the fact that
both the perturbed individual records and the reconstructed distribution are
available to the user as well as the perturbing distribution, as it is specified
in [36]. This metric is based on the concept of mutual information between the
original and perturbed records. The average conditional privacy of an attribute
A, given some other information, modeled with a random variable B, is defined
as 2h(A|B), where h(A|B) is the conditional differential entropy of A given B
representing a measure of uncertainty inherent in the value of A, given the
value of B. The information loss, instead, measures the lack of precision in
estimating the original distribution from the perturbed data. It is defined as
half the expected value of the L1-norm between the original distribution and
the reconstructed one. The proposed metric for evaluating information loss is
related to the amount of mismatch between the original distribution and its
estimate in terms of area. Both the proposed metrics are universal in the sense
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that they can be applied to any reconstruction algorithm, independently from
the particular data mining task applied.
Evfimievski et al. [37], in order to evaluate the privacy breaches, count the
occurrences of an itemset in a randomized transaction and in its sub-items
in the corresponding non randomized transaction. Out of all sub-items of an
itemset, the item causing the worst privacy breach is chosen. Then, for each
combination of transaction size and itemset size, the worst and the average value
of this breach level are computed over all frequent itemsets. Finally, the itemset
size giving the worst value for each of these two values is selected.
Rivzi and Haritsa [81] propose a privacy measure dealing with the probability
with which the user’s distorted entries can be reconstructed. In other words,
the authors estimate the probability that a given 1 or 0 in the true matrix
representing the transactional database can be reconstructed, even if for many
applications the 1’s and 0’s values do not need the same level of privacy.
Kantarcioglu and Clifton in [53] evaluate the methods they propose in terms
of communication and computation costs:
• Communication Cost: is expressed in terms of the number of messages
exchanged among the sites, that are required by the protocol for securely
counting the frequency of each rule.
• Computation cost: is expressed in terms of the number of encryption and
decryption operations required by the specific algorithm.
Oliveira and Zaiane in their work on Clustering PPDM [69] define a perfor-
mance measure that quantifies the fraction of data points which are preserved in
the corresponding clusters mined from the distorted database. More in detail,
a specific parameter, called misclassification error, is also introduced for mea-
suring the amount of legitimate data points that are not well-classified in the
distorted database. Finally, the privacy ensured by such techniques is measured
as the variance difference between the actual and the perturbed values.
In the context of statistical disclosure control a large number of methods,
called masking methods in the SDC jargon, have been developed to preserve in-
dividual privacy when releasing aggregated statistics on data, and more specif-
ically to anonymize the released statistics from those data items that can iden-
tify one among the individual entities (person, household, business, etc.) whose
features are described by the statistics, also taking into account, additionally,
related information publicly available [106]. In [27] a description of the most
relevant masking methods proposed so far is presented. Among the perturbative
methods specifically designed for continuous data, the following masking tech-
niques are described: additive noise, data distortion by probability distribution,
resampling, microaggregation, rank swapping, and so on. For categorical data
both perturbative and non-perturbative methods are presented. The top-coding
and bottom-coding techniques are both applied to ordinal categorical variables;
they recode, respectively, the first/last p values of a variable into a new cat-
egory. The global-recoding technique, instead, recodes the p lowest frequency
categories into a single one. All these masking methods are assessed according
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to the two main parameters: the information loss and the disclosure risk, that
is, the risk that a piece of information be linked to a specific individual. Sev-
eral metrics are presented in the paper for assessing the information loss and
the disclosure risk given by a SDC method. Additionally, in order to provide a
trade-off level between these two metrics, a score is defined that gives the same
importance to disclosure risk and information loss.
1.2 Considerations
In order to define which set of parameters is the most suitable to evaluate PPDM
algorithms, it is previously necessary to define which are the main goals a PPDM
algorithm should satisfy and then, starting from these considerations, reflect on
the dimensions to be taken into account in the evaluation phase. On the basis of
the content of the previous section, it is evident that a PPDM algorithm must
satisfy the following requirements:
1. It should prevent the discovery of sensible information.
2. The sanitized database should be resistant to the various data mining
techniques.
3. It should not compromise the access and use of non sensitive data.
4. It should be usable on large amounts of data.
5. It should not have an exponential computational complexity.
6. It should not consume an high amount of resources
Current PPDM algorithms do not satisfy all these goals at the same time; for
instance, only few of them satisfy the point (2). The above list of goals helps us
to understand how to evaluate these algorithms in a general way. The framework
we have identified is based on the following evaluation dimensions:
• Efficiency, that is, the ability of a privacy preserving algorithm to exe-
cute with good performance in terms of all the resources implied by the
algorithm. It can be used to measure the goal number six.
• Scalability, which evaluates the efficiency trend of a PPDM algorithm
for increasing sizes of the data from which relevant information is mined
while ensuring privacy. It can be used to measure the goal number four.
• Data Quality which evaluate the impact of the sanitization on the data-
base DQ. It is related with the goal number three.
• Hiding Failure, that is, the portion of sensitive information that is not
hidden by the application of a privacy preservation technique. It is related
to the goal number one.
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• Privacy level offered by a privacy preserving technique, which estimates
the degree of uncertainty, according to which sensitive information, that
has been hidden, can still be predicted. It can be used to give an alterna-
tive measure to the goal one and partially to the goal two.
An important question is which one among the presented “dimensions” is the
most relevant for a given privacy preserving technique. Dwork and Nissim [32]
make some interesting observations about this question. In particular, accord-
ing to them in the case of statistical databases privacy is paramount, whereas
in the case of distributed databases for which the privacy is ensured by using a
secure multiparty computation technique, flexibility is of primary importance.
Since a real database usually contains a large number of records, the perfor-
mance guaranteed by a PPDM algorithm, in terms of time and communication
requirements, is a not negligible factor, as well as its trend when increasing
database size.
The quality of data guaranteed by a PPDM algorithm is, on the other hand,
very important when ensuring privacy protection without damaging the data
usability from the authorized users. A trade-off metric can help us to state a
unique value measuring the effectiveness of a PPDM algorithm. In Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra [27] the score of a masking method provides a measure of the
trade-off between disclosure risk and information loss. It is defined as an average
between the ranks of disclosure risk and information loss measures, giving the
same importance to both metrics.
In Duncan, Keller-McNulty and Stokes [31] a R-U confidentiality map is de-
scribed that traces the impact on disclosure risk R and data utility U of changes
in the parameters of a disclosure limitation method which adopts an additive
noise technique. We believe that an index assigning the same importance to
both the data quality and the degree of privacy ensured by a PPDM algorithm
is quite restrictive, because in some contexts one of these parameters can be
more relevant than the other. Moreover, in our opinion the other parameters,
even the less relevant ones, should be also taken into account. The efficiency
and scalability measures, for instance, could be discriminating factors in choos-
ing among a set of PPDM algorithms that ensure similar degrees of privacy and
data utility. A weighted mean could be, thus, a good measure for evaluating by
means of a unique value the quality of a PPDM algorithm. In the current work,
however, we mainly focus on the different evaluation criteria characterizing a
PPDM algorithm.
In the following, we discuss in deep each evaluation criteria we have iden-
tified. More in detail, we divided these criteria into three groups related to
different aspect to be assessed: the Operational Parameters are mainly related
to computational measures, the Privacy Parameters strongly related to the not
evident definition of Privacy and the Data Quality Parameters related to the
already presented concepts of DQ.
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Chapter 2
Operational parameters
The Operational Parameters are mainly related to the computational properties
of the algorithms. In this class of parameters we consider the efficiency, the
scalability, the hiding failure and the complexity. In what follows we give a
detailed definition of these parameters.
2.1 Efficiency
The assessment of the resources used by a privacy preserving data mining al-
gorithm is given by its Efficiency, which represents the ability of the algorithm
to execute with good performance in terms of all used resources. Performance
is assessed, as usually, in terms of time and space, and, in case of distributed
algorithms, in terms of the communication costs incurred during information
exchange.
Time requirements can be evaluated in terms of CPU time, or computational
cost, or even the average of the number of operations required by the PPDM
technique. Clearly, it would be desirable that the algorithms have a polynomial
complexity rather than an exponential one. Anyway, it can be useful to compare
the performance of the privacy preserving method with the performance of the
data mining algorithm for which the privacy preserving method has been devel-
oped. Our initial expectation is that the execution times of the hiding strategies
be proportional to the execution times of the mining algorithms that extract the
sensitive information. Such an expectation was contradicted by tests performed
in some cases. That can be easily explained. In fact in the cases in which the
PPDM algorithm acts simply modifying data without taking into account some
complex criteria like the data quality, the efficiency of the PPDM algorithm
and the DM algorithm for which it was designed to fight against are similar.
Obviously that will not be the same in the case in which, in order to make the
better modifications, the PPDM algorithm adopts more complex strategies.
Space requirements are assessed according to the amount of memory that
must be allocated in order to implement the given algorithm.
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Finally, communication requirements are evaluated for those data mining al-
gorithms, which require information exchanges during the secure mining process,
as the cryptography-based techniques. It is measured in terms of the number
of communications among all the sites involved in the distributed data mining
task.
2.2 Scalability
As in the case of DQ different definitions of scalability have been proposed.
For this reason it is not so simple to define “What we want to measure” in
our particular case. However, one of the fields in which this concept is well
explored is the field of multiprocessor systems. Starting from experiences in
this context we will give our definition of scalability for PPDM algorithms.
In [33] Eager claims that intuitively scalability implies a favorable comparison
between a larger version of some parallel system with either a sequential version
of that same system or a theoretical parallel machine. He relates scalability to
the concept of speedup. More in detail, let time(n, x) be the time required by
an n − processor system to execute a program to solve a of problem of size x,
the speedup on a problem of size x with n processors is the execution time on
one processor divided by the time on n processors:
speedup(n, x) =
time(1, x)
time(n, x)
(2.1)
Moreover, Eager relates Efficiency with speedup as follows:
efficiency(n, x) =
speedup(n, x)
n
=
time(1, x)
n ∗ time(n, x)
(2.2)
Intuitively, a system with a linear speedup (speedup(n, x) = n) can be as-
sumed to be scalable. We can thus propose a first definition:
Definition 1 A system is scalable if efficiency (n, x) = 1 for all algorithms,
number of processors n and problem sizes x.
This is however a not useful definition. As Amdhal [6] notes, many parallel
algorithms have a sequential (or at least not completely parallel) component,
yielding poor efficiency for a sufficiently large number of processors. Moreover
there exists the size problem (it is constant or not?). Some approaches to
scalability are based on the concept of theoretical parallel machines [40] and on
the comparison between the efficiency of the real machine with the theoretical
one.
Starting from these considerations we give a definition tailored for our par-
ticular case. In order to do this, some consideration must be made. We are not
interested to evaluate the case in which an algorithm is executed on a single
processor or on a multiprocessor; we want a measure completely independent
from “hardware constraint”. Moreover in the database context the prominent
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position is occupied by data and its size. We want to link the scalability with
the “database size”. For this reason, a PPDM algorithm has to be designed
and implemented for being scalable with larger and larger datasets. The less
rapid is the decrease in the efficiency of a PPDM algorithm for increasing data
dimensions, the better is its scalability. By recalling equations 2.1 and 2.2 we
can define the scalability as follows:
Definition 2 Let A an algorithm for PPDM, let D a database to be sanitized,
we define the scalability of the algorithm A as the efficiency trend for increasing
values in data sizes of D
Therefore, such parameter concerns the increase of both performance and
storage requirements together with the costs of the communications required by
a distributed technique when data sizes increase.
Formally, we define the scalability as the speedup of a mono-processor com-
putation in function of the size increase of the database.
Scalability = (speedup(1, size(t))) (2.3)
Obviously, given this definition, it is easy to extend it in the case in which we
want to evaluate the PPDM algorithm in a multi-processor context. However
we are not actually interested to this type of application.
2.3 Hiding failure
The percentage of sensitive information that is still discovered, after the data
has been sanitized, gives an estimate of the hiding failure parameter. Most of
the developed privacy preserving algorithms are designed with the goal of ob-
taining zero hiding failure. Thus, they hide all the patterns considered sensitive.
However, it is well known that the more sensitive information we hide, the more
non-sensitive information we miss. Thus, some privacy preserving data mining
algorithms have been recently developed which allow one to choose the amount
of sensitive data that should be hidden in order to find a balance between privacy
and knowledge discovery. It is important to underline that, as we will explain
well after, the hiding failure is not related to the Privacy level Measure. In fact,
the hiding failure measures the percentage of failure in the hiding process, or,
roughly speaking, the number of sensitive information (clusters, rules etc.) not
hidden. The privacy parameter, instead, starting from the assumption that all
the sensitive rules are hidden, measures how strongly the information is hidden.
This concept will be extensively explained in the following chapters.
2.4 Complexity
If an algorithm halts, we define its running time to be the sum of the costs of
each instruction carried out. Within the RAM model of computation, arithmetic
operations involve a single instruction and could be assumed to have a unit cost.
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By computing then the computational cost of an algorithm we have in some
way an alternative measure of the efficiency and scalability of an algorithm.
It represents the theoretical measure of the algorithm behavior. It is however
important, when considering the computational complexity, to take into account
the dimension and the type of the input. In fact, when comparing different
algorithms, if these properties are very different, it does not probably make
sense to consider as discriminant the complexity of the algorithms.
Chapter 3
Privacy Level
In our society the term “Privacy” is overloaded, and can, in general, assume a
wide range of different meanings. For example, in the context of the HIPAA1
Privacy Rule, Privacy means the individual’s ability to control who has the
access to personal health care information. From the organizations point of view,
Privacy involves the definition of policies stating which information is collected,
how it is used, and how customers are informed and involved in this process.
Moreover, there are many other definitions of privacy that are generally related
with the particular environment in which the privacy has to be guaranteed.
What we need is a more generic definition, that can be instantiated to different
environments and situations.
From a philosophical point of view, Schoeman [102] and Walters [103] iden-
tify three possible definitions of privacy:
1. Privacy as the right of a person to determine which personal information
about himself/herself may be communicated to others.
2. Privacy as the control over access to information about oneself.
3. Privacy as limited access to a person and to all the features related to the
person.
These three definitions are very similar apart from some philosophical dif-
ferences that are not in the scope of our work. What is interesting from our
point of view is the concept of “Controlled Information Release” emerging from
the previous definitions. From this idea, we argue that a definition of privacy
that is more related with our target could be the following:
“The right of an individual to be secure from unauthorized disclosure of
information about oneself that is contained in an electronic repository”.
Performing a final tuning of the definition, we consider privacy as:
Definition 3 “The right of an entity to be secure from unauthorized disclosure
1Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
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of sensitive information that are contained in an electronic repository or that
can be derived as aggregate and complex information from data stored in an
electronic repository”
The last generalization is due to the fact that the concept of individual
privacy does not even exist.
As in [67] we consider two main scenarios. The first is the case of a Medical
Database where there is the need to provide information about diseases while
preserving the patient identity.
Another scenario is the classical “Market Basket” database, where the trans-
actions related to different client purchases are stored and from which it is pos-
sible to extract some information in form of association rules like “If a client
buys a product X, he/she will purchase also Z with y% probability”.
The first is an example in which individual privacy has to be ensured by pro-
tecting, from unauthorized disclosure, sensitive information in form of specific
data items related to specific individuals. The second one, instead, emphasizes
how not only the raw data contained into a database must be protected, but also,
in some cases, the high level information that can be derived from non sensitive
raw data need to protected. Such a scenario justifies the final generalization of
our privacy definition.
As we already noted before in this work, PPDM algorithms act in very
different ways in order to hide the sensitive information. The question is then
the following: “The different sanitizations are all equally robust?” or, more
clearly “Which is the effort a malicious agent must spend in order to discover
the hidden information?”. Obviously not all the PPDM algorithms are able to
guarantee the same robustness. For this reason we believe that when evaluating
a set of PPDM algorithm it is necessary to take into account such considerations.
The Privacy Level parameter allows us to measure how strong is the sanitization
performed.
3.1 The Privacy Evaluation in PPDM
As we have explained before, we are interested in assessing the privacy intro-
duced in a database by a sanitization operation. This is a not simple task.
Privacy is an abstract concept and then it is not possible to measure it directly.
However, as with every type of abstract concept, it is possible to measure pri-
vacy in an indirect way, by finding and measuring some phenomena that can be
in some way identified as a direct effect of a privacy variation. The question we
want to solve in this section is then the following “Are there some observable
phenomena linked with the privacy variation?”. An answer to this question
is not straightforward. Moreover, the phenomena we search should have some
desirable characteristics:
• They should be observable in any type of database (we want to provide
an general measure).
• They should be applicable to any type of PPDM sanitization.
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• They should be not directly linked to a sensitive information (otherwise
it could be possible to use the same measure to make a privacy breach).
By analyzing the privacy definition, it is evident that it is strongly related to
the information contained in the sanitized database. Moreover a privacy breach
happens when a malicious user is able to link some information to a specific
object.
The sanitization acts as a “Confusion Agent” that avoids the Malicious User
be able to see clearly the reality. In physics the confusion of a system is strongly
related to the Entropy of a system. The English Oxford Dictionary gives as the
first definition of entropy the following one: “For a closed system, the quantita-
tive measure of the amount of thermal energy not available to do work”. If we
substitute “Thermal Energy” with “Information”, we obtain that the entropy
in some way is the amount of information not available to do work (to be used).
Moreover, in a well known book of R. Feynman [39] the author claims:
So we now have to talk about what we mean by disorder and what we mean by
order. ... Suppose we divide the space into little volume elements. If we have
black and white molecules, how many ways could we distribute them among the
volume elements so that white is on one side and black is on the other? On the
other hand, how many ways could we distribute them with no restriction on
which goes where? Clearly, there are many more ways to arrange them in the
latter case. We measure “disorder” by the number of ways that the insides can
be arranged, so that from the outside it looks the same. The logarithm of
that number of ways is the entropy. The number of ways in the separated case
is less, so the entropy is less, or the ”disorder” is less.
The phrase in bold style is the key of our idea. In fact, the aim of the sanitization
is to hide information in such a way the external users are unable to discover the
modification. Moreover if we assume the original db as an ordered universe, the
sanitization introduces some disorder. The biggest is the disorder, the biggest
is the number of possibilities in which it is possible to rearrange the universe,
and then more difficult is to recover the sensitive information.
To summarize, the intuition is that in some way the entropy of the db is
related to the privacy introduced by the sanitization. That is, however, not
sufficient to define any type of privacy measure. We need to make another little
step. In the 1948 C. Shannon wrote his most famous paper, “A Mathematical
Theory of Communication”. In such paper he give an interpretation of entropy
applicable to the information theory. What it is interesting to underline is that,
when talking about information and communication channel, he defined the
concept of Information Content claiming that the information contained in a
data sent along a communication channel is inversely related to the probability
of occurrence. In other words, the information associated with an event having
a low probability of occurrence is bigger than the one associated with an event
having an high probability of occurrence. He links the concept of Information
Content to the definition of Information Entropy. Thus, our hypothesis is that it
is possible to measure the Privacy introduced by a PPDM algorithm measuring
the variation of Information Content associated to the database.
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3.2 The Privacy Level Measure
In order to evaluate the privacy protection offered by a PPDM algorithm, we
need to define a unique parameter quantifying the privacy level ensured by these
algorithms. As previously stated, a metric for evaluating the privacy level offered
by a PPDM method is proposed in [4]: if the perturbed value of an attribute
can be estimated, with a confidence c, to belong to an interval [a, b], then the
privacy is estimated by (b − a) with confidence c. This metric does not work
well because it does not take into account the distribution of the original data
along with the perturbed data. We need, therefore, a metric that considers all
the informative contents of data available to the user. Agrawal and Aggarwal [2]
address this problem by introducing a new privacy metric based on the concept
of information entropy.
Shannon in formulating his most well-known theorem [87] defines the concept
of Information Entropy as follows: let X be a random variable which takes on
a finite set of values according to a probability distribution p(x). Then, the
entropy of this probability distribution is defined as follows:
h(X) = −
∑
p(x) log2(p(x)) (3.1)
or, in the continuous case:
h(X) = −
∫
f(x) log2(f(x))dx (3.2)
where f(x) denotes the density function of the continuous random variable x.
Information Entropy is a measure of how much “choice” is involved in the
selection of an event or how uncertain we are of its outcome. It can be used
for quantifying the amount of information associated with a set of data. The
concept of “information associated with data” can be useful in evaluating the
privacy achieved by a PPDM algorithm as we mentioned in the previous sec-
tion. Because the entropy represents the information content of a datum, the
entropy after data sanitization should be higher than the entropy before the
sanitization. Moreover the entropy can be considered as the evaluation of the
uncertain forecast level of an event which in our context is evaluation of the
right value of a datum.
As in [2], we measure the level of privacy inherent in an attribute X, given
some information modeled by Y , by the following quantity:
Π(X|Y ) = 2− fX,Y (x,y) log2 fX|Y =y(x))dxdy (3.3)
in which the exponent is the conditional entropy of a random variable X (mod-
eling the original data )given a random variable Y (modeling the sanitized (per-
turbed) data)
However, we have to notice that the value of the privacy level depends not
only on the PPDM algorithm used, but also on the knowledge that an attacker
has about the data before the use of data mining techniques and the relevance of
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this knowledge in the data reconstruction operation. This problem is underlined,
for example, in [95, 96]. In order to solve this problem, with respect to the
expression 3.3, it is possible to introduce assumptions on the attacker knowledge
by properly modeling Y . Due to the fact that we are interested actually in
measuring the privacy level of the PPDM algorithm without making assumption
on the environment in which the algorithm will work, we actually do not consider
this extension.
The measure of the entropy level, and thus of the privacy level, is very gen-
eral and in order to use it in the different PPDM contexts, it must be refined
with respect to some characteristics like the type of transactions, the type of
aggregation and PPDM methods. Here, for example, we show how the entropy
concept can be instantiated in order to evaluate the privacy level in the context
of “association rules”. Our approach is based on the work of Smyth and Good-
man [91] that use the concept of Information Entropy in order to measure the
amount of information contained in the association rules extracted from a data-
base, with the aim of ranking and thus characterizing the most important rules
in terms of information they contain. They think of a rule y ⇒ x as a condition
if Y=y then X=x with a certain probability p. Intuitively the two random vari-
ables can be viewed as being connected by a discrete memoryless channel. The
channel transition probabilities are the conditional probabilities between the
two variables. A rule corresponds to a particular input event Y=y, rather than
the average over all input events as is defined for communication channels, and
p, the rule probability, is the transition probability p(X = x|Y = y). Starting
from these assumptions, it is possible then define the Instantaneous Information
(i.e. the information we have about X knowing that Y=y occurs) as a function
f(X:Y = y). As defined by Shannon in [87] a requirement for f is that
Ey[f(X:Y = y)] = I(X:Y) (3.4)
where Ey is the expectation with respect to the random variable Y. In [12],
Blachman showed that f(X:Y=y) is not unique and it has two possible solutions,
the i-measure and the j-measure.
i(X:Y = y) =
∑
x
p(x)log
(
1
p(x)
)
−
∑
x
p(x|y)log
(
1
p(x|y)
)
(3.5)
j(X:Y = y) =
∑
x
p(x|y)log
(
p(x|y)
p(x)
)
(3.6)
Between the two measures, the only one, as proved by Blachman, that is not
negative is the j measure. Adapting this measure to the case of a rule (a rule
give information about the event X=x and its complement x¯), it is possible to
obtain the following function:
jr(x, Y = y) = p(x|y) log
p(x|y)
p(x)
+ (1− p(x|y)) log
1− p(x|y)
1− p(x)
. (3.7)
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representing the cross-entropy of a rule.
Finally it is possible to define a J-measure representing the entropy of a rule
as:
J(x, Y = y) = p(y)jr(x, Y = y) (3.8)
where the term p(y) is the probability of the rule antecedent.
If we consider the association rules model and a specific rule y ⇒ x, the
value p(y), that is, the probability of antecedent, is equal to frequency of y and
the value p(x|y) is the probability that the variable X assumes the value x,
given that y is the value of variable Y. It represents the strength of the rule if
Y=y then X=x and it is referred to as confidence of the rule. Now, we define a
parameter entropy privacy (EP ) as:
EP = J(x, Y = y)− J1(x, Y = y) (3.9)
where J1 is the J-measure after the operation of data hiding. Some prelimi-
nary tests executed in the context of this work, show that the simple J-measure
does not provide an intuitive evaluation parameter. In fact, as the Information
Theory suggests, we would expect as result that when the confidence decreases,
the level of entropy increases (see Figure 3.1). Indeed, in some particular cases,
the trend obtained is the one shown in Figure 3.2. This is due to the fact
that the J-measure represents the average conditional mutual information, or,
in other words, the difference between the “a priori” and “a posteriori” proba-
bilistic distributions of the two random variables X and Y . On the base of this
observation, we note that if:
• P (X ∧ Y ) < P (X) × P (Y ) the two variables X and Y are negatively
correlated
• P (X ∧ Y ) > P (X) × P (Y ) the two variables X and Y are positively
correlated
• P (X ∧ Y ) = P (X)× P (Y ) the two variables X and Y are independent
By remembering that:
P (X ∧ Y )
P (Y )
= P (X|Y ) (3.10)
we observe than the J-measure does not take into account the type of correlation
between the involved random variables. In fact that happen only in the case in
which during the sanitization process, the confidence of the rule remains under
the value of the support. In this case, when the confidence value decrease,
the J-measure value increase. Studying the J-measure function, it is possible
to see that it always has a minimum. The derived function is negative when
p(x|y) < p(x) and positive when p(x|y) > p(x). For this reason, we finally adopt
as measure the derivative of the J-measure (for make easy to understand the
steps, s is equal to p(x), b is equal to p(y) and x is equal to (p(x|y))):
J ′(X;Y = y) =
(
b ∗
(
x ∗ log2
(x
a
)
+ (1− x) ∗ log2
(
1− x
1− a
)))
= (3.11)
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Rules Sup. Ant. Conf Sup. Post. j J
12 → 21 0.302466208 0.310074481 0.313018734 0.00002 0.000006
After sanitization 0.290372303 0.203756635 0.29049087 0.019570 0.005683
43 → 12 0.22290728 0.325 0.302466208 0.0018 0.000265
After sanitization 0.198482333 0.118876941 0.278041262 0.074538 0.014794
45 → 8 0.296063552 0.315178214 0.298672042 0.000644 0.000191
After sanitization 0.261204648 0.090331366 0.263813137 0.095670 0.024989
Table 3.1: Example of rule entropy before and after the sanitization phase
Figure 3.1: Evolution of information entropy with respect to confidence
= b∗
(
1 ∗ log2
(x
a
)
+ x ∗
a
x
∗
1
a
− 1 ∗ log2
(
1− x
1− a
)
+ (1− x) ∗
1− a
1− x
∗
−1
1− a
)
=
(3.12)
= b ∗
(
log2
(x
a
)
+ 1− log2
(
1− x
1− a
)
− 1
)
= b ∗
(
log2
(x
a
)
− log2
(
1− x
1− a
))
(3.13)
Making the propers substitutions we obtain:
J ′(X;Y = y) = p(y) ∗ (log2(
p(x|y)
p(x)
)− log2(
1− p(x|y)
1− p(x)
)) (3.14)
Fig 3.3 shows the graph obtained when using J ′.
Finally, we measure the amount of privacy introduced by the following expres-
sion:
Level of privacy = (J ′1 − J
′) (3.15)
where J ′1 is the calculated after the sanitization and J
′ is measured before
sanitization.
We observe that a decrease in the confidence value, and therefore an increase
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of information entropy with respect to confidence in
some particular cases
in the level of privacy, results in an increase of entropy, as shown in Fig. 3.3.
This trend is in accordance with the Information Theory, because if a rule or in
general an information is well hidden, the informative value of its discovery is
higher than an information that is simple to discover.
The measure we provided show how to use the concept of Information Con-
tent to measure the Privacy level introduced by a sanitization in the context of
Association Rule Mining. Making a little step, it is possible to extend this mea-
sure to the case of Classification PPDM algorithms. In fact, in the classification
context, we are interested to find a classification model able to describe some
elements contained in a database. To each classification model, if we assume
to be able to build the classification pattern, it is possible to associate a set of
rules like the following:
if A1 A2...An then Ci
where each rule represent a class of the model. Applying then the expression
3.15 to these rules, we are able to compute the privacy lever introduced for every
class.
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Chapter 4
Data Quality
The quality of the data is one of the most important properties of a database.
Higher is the DQ, the better is the real world representation given by the models
contained in the database and the higher is the usefulness of the information of
the data contained in the database.
Therefore a set of operations that in some way contribute to downgrade the
DQ of a database may results in huge economical and, in some specific cases,
social damages.
The sanitization process performed by a PPDM algorithm constitutes poten-
tially one of these specifications. For this reason it is important, when assessing
PPDM algorithms, to take into account this relevant aspect. In what follows
we present a set of parameters, called Raw Parameters, that can be used to
make a non accurate, on the fly, DQ evaluation. Moreover, we present a most
sophisticated techniques based on the concept of Information Quality Model.
Finally we will describe a three-step framework that allows one to select from a
set of PPDM algorithm the most suitable for a target database with respect to
both Operational and DQ parameters.
In some cases it can be useful to be able to give a non detailed but fast
evaluation of the quality of the data mining results after the sanitization process.
For example in order to identify from a set of PPDM algorithms, the subset with
a general high impact on the DQ.
In order to perform a fast assessment of damages to DQ, it can be useful
to analyze what happens at macroscopic level when a generic PPDM algorithm
is applied to a database. Some experimental measurements (contained in the
appendix), show that the most evident effect of a PPDM algorithm with an high
impact on DQ is generally identified as an Information Loss of a database. It
is possible then to identify the Information Loss as first crude measure of the
DQ impact of PPDM algorithm.
Data can be analyzed in order to mine information in terms of associations
among single data items or to classify existing data with the goal of finding an
accurate classification of new data items, and so on. Based on the intended
data use, the information loss is measured with a specific metric, depending
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each time on the particular type of knowledge model one aims to extract. If the
intended data usage is data clustering, the information loss can be measured
by the percentage of legitimate data points that are not well-classified after the
sanitization process. Data modification often applied by a privacy preserving
technique obviously affects the parameters involved in the clustering analysis.
There is, thus, the need to control, as much as possible, the results of such
analysis before and after the application of a data hiding technique.
When quantifying information loss in the context of the other data usages,
it is useful to distinguish between:
• Lost information representing the percentage of non-sensitive patterns
(i.e., association, classification rules) which are hidden as side-effect of the
hiding process
• Artifactual information representing the percentage of artifactual pat-
terns created by the adopted privacy preserving technique
In case of association rules, the lost information can be modeled as the
set of nonsensitive rules that are accidentally hidden, referred to as lost rules,
by the privacy preservation technique. The artifactual information, instead,
represents the set of new rules, also known as ghost rules, that can be extracted
from the database after the application of a sanitization technique. Similarly, if
the aim of the mining task is data classification, e.g. by means of decision trees
inductions, both the lost and artifactual information can be quantified by means
of the corresponding lost and ghost association rules derived by the classification
tree. These measures allow one to evaluate the high level information that are
extracted from a database in form of the widely-used inference rules before and
after the application of a PPDM algorithm.
4.1 Data Quality in the Context of PPDM
Traditionally DQ is a measure of the consistency between the data views pre-
sented by an information system and the same data in the real-world [70]. This
definition is strongly related with the classical definition of information system
as a “model of a finite subset of the real world” [56]. More in detail Levitin
and Redman [59] claim that DQ is the instrument by which it is possible to
evaluate if data models are well defined and data values accurate. The main
problem with DQ is that its evaluation is relative [94], in that it usually de-
pends from the context in which data are used. In the scientific literature DQ
is considered a multi-dimensional concept that in some environments involves
both objective and subjective parameters [104, 105]. In the context of PPDM,
we are interested in assessing whether, given a target database, the sanitization
phase will compromise the quality of the mining results that can be obtained
from the sanitized database. The parameters we consider relevant in the con-
text of PPPDM are the following: the Accuracy, measuring the proximity of a
sanitized value aI to the original value a; the Completeness, evaluating the per-
centage of data from the original database that are missing from the sanitized
4.1. DATA QUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PPDM 29
database and finally the Consistency that is related to the semantic constraints
holding on the data and it measures how many of these constraints are still
satisfied after the sanitization. We now present the formal definitions of those
parameters for use in the remainder of the discussion. Let OD be the original
database and SD be the sanitized database resulting from the application of the
PPDM algorithm. Without loosing generality and in order to make simpler the
following definitions, we assume that OD (and consequently SD) be composed
by a single relation. We also adopt the positional notation to denote attributes
in relations. Thus, let odi (sdi) be the i-th tuple in OD (SD), then odik (sdik)
denotes the kth attribute of odi (sdi). Moreover, let n be the total number of the
attributes of interest, we assume that attributes of positions 1, . . . ,m (m ≤ n)
are the primary key attributes of the relation.
Definition 1 1: Let sdj be a tuple of SD. We say that sdj is Accurate
if ¬∃odi ∈ OD such that ((odik = sdjk)∀k = 1..m ∧ ∃(odif 6= sdjf ), (sdjf 6=
NULL), f = m + 1, .., n).
Definition 2 2:A sdj is Complete if (∃odi ∈ OD such that (odik = sdjk)∀k =
1..m) ∧ (¬∃(sdjf = NULL), f = m + 1, .., n).
Let C the set of the constraints defined on database OD, in what follows we
denote with cij the j
th constraint on attribute i. We assume here constraints
on a single attribute, but, it is easily possible to extend the measure to complex
constraints.
Definition 3 3: An instance sdk is Consistent if ¬∃cij ∈ C such that cij(sdki) =
false, i = 1..n
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Chapter 5
Information Driven Data
Quality Schema
Current approaches to PPDM algorithms do not take into account two impor-
tant aspects:
• Relevance of data: not all the information stored in the database has
the same level of relevance and not all the information can be dealt at the
same way.
• Structure of the database: information stored in a database is strongly
influenced by the relationships between the different data items. These
relationships are not always explicit.
We believe that in a context in which a database administrator needs to choose
which is the most suitable PPDM algorithm for a target real database, it is
necessary to also take into account the above aspects. To achieve this goal we
propose to use Data Quality in order to assess how and if these aspects are
preserved after a data hiding sanitization.
5.1 The Information Quality Model
In order evaluate DQ it is necessary to provide a formal description that allow
us to magnify the aggregate information of interest for a target database and
the relevance of DQ properties for each aggregate information (AI) and for each
attribute involved in the AI. The Information Quality Model (IQM) proposed
here addresses this requirement. In the following, we give a formal definition
for an Attribute Class (AC), a Data Model Graph (DMG) (used to represent
the attributes involved in an aggregate information and their constraints) and
an Aggregation Information Schema (AIS).Before giving the definition of DMG,
AIS and ASSET we introduce some preliminary concepts.
Definition 3 4: An Attribute Class is defined as the tuple
ATC =< name,AW,AV,CW,CV,CSV, Slink > where:
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• Name is the attribute id
• AW is the accuracy weigh for the target attribute
• AV is the accuracy value
• CW is the completeness weigh for the target attribute
• CV is the completeness value
• CSV is the consistency value
• Slink is list of simple constraints.
Definition 4 5: A Simple Constraint Class is defined as the tuple
SCC =< name,Constr, CW,Clink, CSV > where:
• Name is the constraint id
• Constraint describes the constraint using some logic expression
• CW is the weigh of the constraint. It represents the relevance of this constraint
in the AIS
• CSV is the number of violations to the constraint
• Clink it is the list of complex constraints defined on SCC .
Definition 5 6: A Complex Constraint Class is defined as the tuple
CCC =< name,Operator,CW,CSV, SCC link > where:
• Name is the Complex Constraint id
• Operator is the “Merging” operator by which the simple constraints are used to
build the complex one.
• CW is the weigh of the complex constraint
• CSV is the number of violations
• SCC link is the list of all the SCC that are related to the CCC .
Let D a database, we are able now to define the DMG, AIS and ASSET on
D.
Definition 5 7 : A DMG (Data Model Graph) is an oriented graph with the
following features:
• A set of nodes NA where each node is an Attribute Class
• A set of nodes SCC where each node describes a Simple Constraint Class
• A set of nodes CCC where each node describes a Complex Constraint Class
• A set of direct edges LNj,Nk : LNj,Nk ∈ ((NAXSCC)∪(SCCXCCC)∪(SCCXNA)∪
(CCCXNA)).
Definition 6 8: An AIS φ is defined as a tuple < γ, ξ, λ, ϑ,$,WAIS > where:
γ is a name, ξ is a DMG, λ is the accuracy of AIS, ϑ is the completeness of
AIS, $ is the consistency of AIS and WAIS represent the relevance of AIS in
the database.
We are now able to identify as ASSET (Aggregate information Schema Set)
as the collection of all the relevant AIS of the database.
The DMG completely describes the relations between the different data items
of a given AIS and the relevance of each of these data respect to the data
quality parameter. It is the “road map” that is used to evaluate the quality of
a sanitized AIS
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5.2 Data Quality Evaluation of AIS
By adopting the IQM scheme, now we are able to evaluate the data quality
at the attribute level. By recalling Definition (1,2), we define the Accuracy
lack of an attribute k for an AIS A as the proportion of non accurate items
in a database SD. Ate the same way, the Completeness lack of an attribute k
is defined as the proportion of non complete items in SD. The accuracy lack
index for an AIS can the be evaluated as follows:
ACL =
i=n

i=0
DMG.Ni.AV ∗DMG.Ni.AW (5.1)
where DMG.Ni.AW is the accuracy weight associated with the attribute iden-
tified by the node Ni. Similarly the completeness lack of an AIS can be measured
as follows:
CML =
i=n

i=0
DMG.Ni.CV ∗ DMG.Ni.CW (5.2)
Finally the consistency lack index associated with an AIS is given by number
of constraint violations occurred in all the sanitized transaction multiplied by
the weight associated with every constraints (simple or complex).
CSL =
i=n

i=0
DMG.SCi.csv∗DMG.SCi.cw+
j=m

j=0
DMG.CCj .csv∗DMG.CCj .cw (5.3)
5.3 The Evaluation Algorithm
In this section we present the methodology we have developed to evaluate the
data quality of the AIS. This methodology is organized in two main phases:
• Search: in this phase all the tuples modified in the sanitized database are
identified. The primary keys of all these transaction (we assume that the
sanitization process does not change the primary key), are stored in a set
named evalset. This set is the input of the Evaluation phase.
• Evaluation: in this phase the accuracy, the consistency and the com-
pleteness associated with the DMG and the AIS are evaluated using in-
formation on the accuracy and completeness weight associated with the
DMG and related to the transactions in Evalset.
The algorithms for these phases are reported in Figures 1 and 2. Once the
evaluation process is completed, a set of values is associated with each AIS that
gives the balanced level of accuracy, completeness and consistency. However,
this set may not be enough. A simple average of the different AIS’s values could
not be significant, because even in this case not all the AIS’s in the ASSET have
the same relevance. For this reason, a weight is associated with each AIS that
represents the importance of the high level information represented by the AIS
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INPUT: Original database OD, Sanitized database SD
OUTPUT: a set Evalset of primary keys
Begin
Foreach ti ∈ OD do
{j=0;
While (sjk 6= tik)and(j < |SD|)do j + +;
l=0;
While (sjl = til)and(l < n) do l++;
If(l < n)Then Evalset = Evalset ∪ tik
}
End
Figure 5.1: Search algorithm
in the target context.The accuracy, the completeness and the consistency of the
ASSET for each PPDM algorithm candidate are then evaluated as follows:
AccuracyAsset =
  i=|Asset|
i=0 AISi.accuracy ∗ AISi.W
|Asset|
(5.4)
CompletenessAsset =
  i=|Asset|
i=0
AISi.completeness ∗AISi.W
|Asset|
(5.5)
ConsistencyAsset =
  i=|Asset|
i=0 AISi.consistency ∗ AISi.W
|Asset|
(5.6)
where AISi.W represents the weight (relevance) associated with the i-th AIS.
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INPUT: the original database OD, the sanitized database SD,Evalset, IQM.
OUTPUT: the IQM containing a data quality evaluation
Begin
Foreach IES in IQM do
{DMG = IQM.IES.link;
avet = 0;cvet = 0;
Foreach (tik ∈ Evalset)do
For(j = 0; j < n; j + +) do
If (tij 6= sij) Then
{
If sij = NULL Then cvet[j] + +;
Else avet[j] + +;
validate constr(IES,DMG,j)
}
For(m = 0; m < n; m + +)do
{ DMG.Nm.AV =
avet[m]
|SD|
; DMG.Nm.CV =
cvet[m]
|SD|
;}
IQM.IES.AV = i=ni=0 (DMG.Ni.AV ∗ DMG.Ni.AW );
IQM.IES.CV = i=ni=0 (DMG.Ni.CV ∗ DMG.Ni.CW );
IQM.IES.CSV = i=ni=0 DMG.SCi.CSV ∗ DMG.SCi.CW+
j=m
j=0
DMG.CCj.CSV ∗ DMG.CCj.CW ;}
End
Procedure validate constr(IES,DMg,j) Begin
NA=AIS.DMG.j
For k=1; k < |NA.slink|; k++
{ NC = NA.Slink[k]
ifNC .Clink == NULL then{if !(NC .constr(sij)) then NC .CSV + +;}
else{ NO=NC .Clink; globalconstr=composeconstr(NO, sij)
if !(globalconstr) then NO.CSV + +}}
End
Figure 5.2: Evaluation Algorithm
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Chapter 6
Evaluation Framework
As shown by the approaches reported Chapter 2, and especially by the approach
by Bertino et al. [10], in many real world applications, it is necessary to take
into account even other parameters that are not directly related to DQ. On
the other hand we believe that DQ should represent the invariant of a PPDM
evaluation and should be used to identify the best algorithm within a set of
previously selected “Best Algorithms”. To preselect this “best set”, we sug-
gest to use some parameters as discriminant to select the algorithms that have
an acceptable behavior under some aspects generally considered relevant espe-
cially in “production environments” (efficiency, scalability, hiding failure and
level of privacy). In order to understand if these four parameters are sufficient
to identify an acceptable set of candidates, we performed an evaluation test.
We identified a starting set of PPDM algorithms for Association Rules Hiding
(the algorithms presented in [97] and a new set of three algorithms based on
data fuzzification [10]). Then, by using the IBM synthetic data generator1we
generated a categoric database representing an hypothetical Health Database
storing the different therapies associated with the patients. We also built the
associated DMG. On this database, we applied the different algorithms and
then we measured the previous parameters. Once we built the “Best Set” we
discovered that some algorithms that performed less changes to the database,
which in some way indicates a better quality, are not in this set. A reason is for
example a low efficiency. For this reason we believe that even in the preselec-
tion phase a “coarse” DQ parameter must be introduced. In our opinion, the
Coarse DQ Measure depends on the specific class of PPDM algorithms. If the
algorithms adopt a perturbation or a blocking technique, the coarse DQ can be
measured by the dissimilarity between the original dataset D and the sanitized
one D’ by measuring, for example, in the case of transactional datasets, the
difference between the item frequencies of the two datasets before and after the
sanitization. Such dissimilarity can be estimated by the following expression:
Diss(D, D′) =
  n
i=1 |fD(i)− fD′(i)|
  n
i=1
fD(i)
(6.1)
1http://www.almaden.ibm.com/software/quest/Resources/datasets/syndata.html
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where i is a data item in the original database D, and fD(i) is its frequency
within the database, whereas i’ is the given data item after the application
of a privacy preservation technique and fD′(i) is its new frequency within the
transformed database D’. The same method can be used, extending the previous
formula, also in the case of blocking techniques. If the data modification consists
of aggregating some data values, the coarse DQ is given by the loss of detail in
the data. As in the case of the k−Anonymity algorithm [92], given a database
DB with NA attributes and N transactions, if we identify as generalization
scheme a domain generalization hierarchy GT with a depth h, it is possible to
measure the coarse quality of a sanitized database SDB as:
Quality(SDB) = 1−
  i=NA
i=1
  i=N
j=1
h
|GTAi|
|DB| ∗ |NA|
(6.2)
where h|GTAi| represent the detail loss for each cell sanitized.
Once we have identified the Best Set we are able to apply our DQ-driven
evaluation.
We now present a three steps Evaluation Framework based on the previous
concepts.
1. A set of “Interesting” PPDM’s is selected. These algorithms are tested on
a generic database and evaluated according the general parameters (Effi-
ciency, Scalability, Hiding failure, Coarse Data Quality, Level of privacy).
The result of this step is a restricted set of Candidate algorithms
2. A test database with the same characteristics of the target database is
generated. An IQM schema with the AIS and the related DMG is the
result of this step.
3. The Information Driven DQ Evaluation Algorithm is applied in order to
identify the algorithm that finally will be applied.
As it is probably obvious to the readers, the most “time consuming” step
in terms of required user interactions is step 2. The design a good IQM is the
core of our evaluation framework. We believe that a top down approach is, in
this cases, the most appropriate. More in detail, the first task should be the
identification of the high level information that is relevant and for which we
are interested in measuring the impact of PPDM algorithms. It could also can
be useful to involve in this task some authorized users (e.g. in case of Health
DBA’s, doctors, etc.) in order to understand all the possible uses of the data-
base and the relevance of the retrieved information. The use of datamining tools
could be useful to identify non-evident aggregate information.
A second task would then, given the high level information, determine the dif-
ferent constraints (both simple and complex) and evaluate their relevance. Also
in this case, discussions with authorized users and DB designers, and the use
of DM tools (e.g. discover association rules) could help to build a good IQM.
Finally it is necessary, by taking into account all the previous information, to
rate the relevance of the attributes involved. This top down analysis is useful
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not only for the specific case of PPDM evaluation, but, if well developed, is
a powerful tool to understand the real information contents, its value and the
relation between the information stored in a given database. In the context of
an “Information Society” this is a non negligible added value.
6.1 A three-steps framework for the evaluation
of PPDM algorithms
As shown by the approaches reported in the state of the art, and especially by
the approach by Bertino et al. [10], in many real world applications, it is nec-
essary to take into account also other parameters that are not directly related
to DQ. On the other hand we believe that DQ should represent the invariant of
a PPDM evaluation and should be used to identify the best algorithm within a
set of previously selected “Best Algorithms”. To preselect this “best set”, we
suggest to use the Operational Parameters presented before as discriminant to
select the algorithms that have an acceptable behavior under some aspects gen-
erally considered relevant especially in “production environments” (efficiency,
scalability, hiding failure and level of privacy).
In order to understand if these four parameters are sufficient to identify an
acceptable set of candidates, we performed an evaluation test. We identified a
starting set of PPDM algorithms for Association Rules Hiding (the algorithms
presented in [97] and a new set of three algorithms based on data fuzzifica-
tion [10]). Then, by using the IBM synthetic data generator2 we generated
a categoric database representing an hypothetical Health database storing the
different therapies associated with the patients. We also built the associated
DMG. On this database, we applied the different algorithms and then we mea-
sured the previous parameters. Once we built the “Best Set” we discovered
that some algorithms that performed less changes to the database, which in
some way indicates a better quality, are not in this set. A reason is for example
a low efficiency. For this reason we believe that even in the preselection phase
a “coarse” DQ parameter must be introduced. In our opinion, the Coarse DQ
Measure depends on the specific class of PPDM algorithms. If the algorithms
adopt a perturbation or a blocking technique, the coarse DQ can be measured
by the dissimilarity between the original dataset D and the sanitized one D’ by
measuring, for example, in the case of transactional datasets, the difference be-
tween the item frequencies of the two datasets before and after the sanitization.
Such dissimilarity can be estimated by the following expression:
Diss(D, D′) =
  n
i=1 |fD(i)− fD′(i)|
  n
i=1
fD(i)
(6.3)
where i is a data item in the original database D, and fD(i) is its frequency
within the database, whereas i’ is the given data item after the application
of a privacy preservation technique and fD′(i) is its new frequency within the
transformed database D’. The same method can be used, extending the previous
formula, also in the case of blocking techniques. If the data modification consists
2http://www.almaden.ibm.com/software/quest/Resources/datasets/syndata.html
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of aggregating some data values, the coarse DQ is given by the loss of detail in
the data. As in the case of the k−Anonymity algorithm [92], given a database
DB with NA attributes and N transactions, if we identify as generalization
scheme a domain generalization hierarchy GT with a depth h, it is possible to
measure the coarse quality of a sanitized database SDB as:
Quality(SDB) = 1−
  i=NA
i=1
  i=N
j=1
h
|GTAi|
|DB| ∗ |NA|
(6.4)
where h|GTAi| represent the detail loss for each cell sanitized. Once we have
identified the Best Set we are able to apply our DQ-driven evaluation.
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Figure 6.1: The Evaluation Framework
We now present a three steps Evaluation Framework based on the previous
concepts.
1. A set of “Interesting” PPDM’s is selected. These algorithms are tested on
a generic database and evaluated according the general parameters (Effi-
ciency, Scalability, Hiding failure, Coarse Data Quality, Level of privacy).
The result of this step is a restricted set of Candidate algorithms
2. A test database with the same characteristics of the target database is
generated. An IQM schema with the AIS and the related DMG is the
result of this step.
3. The Information Driven DQ Evaluation Algorithm is applied in order to
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identify the algorithm that finally will be applied.
As it is probably obvious to the readers, the most “time consuming” step
in terms of required user interactions is step 2. The design of a good IQM is
the core of our evaluation framework. We believe that a top down approach
is, in this cases, the most appropriate. More in detail, the first task should be
the identification of the high level information that is relevant and for which
we are interested in measuring the impact of PPDM algorithms. It could also
can be useful to involve in this task some authorized users (e.g. in case of
Health DBA’s, doctors, etc.) in order to understand all the possible uses of the
database and the relevance of the retrieved information. The use of datamining
tools could be useful to identify non-evident aggregate information.
A second task would then be, given the high level information, to determine the
different constraints (both simple and complex) and evaluate their relevance.
Also in this case, discussions with authorized users and DB designers, and the
use of DM tools (e.g. discover association rules) could help to build a good IQM.
Finally it is necessary, by taking into account all the previous information, to
rate the relevance of the attributes involved. This top down analysis is useful
not only for the specific case of PPDM evaluation, but, if well developed, is
a powerful tool to understand the real information contents, its value and the
relation between the information stored in a given database. In the context of
an “Information Society” this is a non negligible added value.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The existence of a complete framework allowing to evaluate in a general and
complete way a PPDM algorithm, is a mandatory condition if we want to really
use these algorithms in the real world over real applications. In this report we
have presented the last results obtained in this field.
A PPDM algorithm is conceived to protect sensitive information from an
unauthorized disclosure. This automatically implies that the PPDM Algorithms
are strongly related to the concept of Privacy. For this reason we explored this
concept, and we developed a new approach based on the Shannon Entropy
in order to give a measure of the Privacy introduced by the use of a PPDM
algorithm. Moreover we gave an instantiation of this measure in the context of
Association Rule Hiding and in the context of Classification Hiding. We plan
to extend this study in the direction of the cluster hiding.
It is, however, not possible to measure the PPDM algorithm only in term
of the performance (i.e. scalability, efficiency etc.). Due to the intrinsic in-
formation driven nature of the PPDM algorithms, in fact, their impact on the
different databases, may be extremely different. For this reason, in order to be
an instrument useful to select the right algorithm for a particular situation, such
a framework must be able to magnify the behavior of the PPDM algorithms over
a target database taking into consideration even its impact on the DQ of the
sanitized database.
In this report, we have proposed an approach based on the concept of DQ
as main discriminant in the PPDM Algorithm evaluation. We introduced some
algorithms in order to perform this task and we presented a three-steps method-
ology allowing to take in consideration even the other type of parameters more
related to the “pure performance” provided. Also in this case we gave an im-
plementation of this concept conceived for association rule hiding, but, in this
case, the algorithms can be easily adapted for the evaluation of every type of
PPDM techniques.
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Abstract 
Privacy is one of the most important properties an information system must satisfy. A relatively new trend shows 
that classical access control techniques are not sufficient to guarantee privacy when datamining techniques are 
used. Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) algorithms have been recently introduced with the aim of 
modifying the database in such a way to prevent the discovery of sensible information. Due to the large amount 
of possible techniques that can be used to achieve this goal, it is necessary to provide some standard 
evaluation metrics to determine the best algorithms for a specific application or context. Currently, however, 
there is no common set of parameters that can be used for this purpose. Moreover, because sanitization 
modifies the data, an important issue, especially for critical data, is to preserve the quality of data. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, no approaches have been developed dealing with the issue of data quality in the 
context of PPDM algorithms. This report explores the problem of PPDM algorithm evaluation, starting from the 
key goal of preserving of data quality. To achieve such goal, we propose a formal definition of data quality 
specifically tailored for use in the context of PPDM algorithms, a set of evaluation parameters and an evaluation 
algorithm. Moreover, because of the ``environment related'' nature of data quality, a structure to represent 
constraints and information relevance related to data is presented. The resulting evaluation core process is then 
presented as a part of a more general three step evaluation framework, taking also into account other aspects 
of the algorithm evaluation such as efficiency, scalability and level of privacy. 
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